What is the nature of enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act?
From India, New Delhi
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The nature of inquiry under Section 33(2) of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
The nature of inquiry under Section 33(2) of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is to determine and prove that the action of the employee/workmen falls under the category of misconduct in light of the standing orders or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman. Unless he has been paid wages for one month, where an application of the employer has been made and is pending approval of the action taken by the employer.
Findings of the learned Single Judge
The finding of the learned Single Judge can be summarized as follows:
(a) The learned Single Judge held that the Industrial Tribunal had misconstrued the scope of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act and had failed to take note of the distinction between deciding the application under the aforementioned provision and deciding a labor dispute. The court further held that while considering the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act, the Industrial Tribunal is required to examine whether a prima facie case has been made out regarding the validity of the domestic inquiry against the delinquent employee (reference is made to paras 23, 24, 34, and 35 of the impugned judgment). On this issue, the learned Single Judge has placed reliance on several decisions passed by the Apex Court in the case titled as Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Dasappa (B) (Binny Mills Labour Union), (1960) II LLJ 39 SC, Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 860, Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee, (1958) I LLJ 247 SC, and Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, 1 (1999) SLT 212.
(b) The Industrial Tribunal wrongly held that the inquiry proceedings were vitiated on the ground that the Appellant was not permitted to have proper representation. The Court noted that the witnesses of the Management were cross-examined by the Appellant, and therefore, the Industrial Tribunal ought to have examined the question of whether following such a procedure caused any prejudice to the Appellant. This question needed to be addressed before concluding that the inquiry was vitiated due to the lack of representation of the Appellant (reference is made to para 31 of the impugned judgment).
(c) The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to granting approval or rejecting the application, and it cannot order reinstatement with back wages (reference is made to para 36 of the impugned judgment).
From India, Mumbai
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The nature of inquiry under Section 33(2) of The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is to determine and prove that the action of the employee/workmen falls under the category of misconduct in light of the standing orders or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman. Unless he has been paid wages for one month, where an application of the employer has been made and is pending approval of the action taken by the employer.
Findings of the learned Single Judge
The finding of the learned Single Judge can be summarized as follows:
(a) The learned Single Judge held that the Industrial Tribunal had misconstrued the scope of Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act and had failed to take note of the distinction between deciding the application under the aforementioned provision and deciding a labor dispute. The court further held that while considering the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act, the Industrial Tribunal is required to examine whether a prima facie case has been made out regarding the validity of the domestic inquiry against the delinquent employee (reference is made to paras 23, 24, 34, and 35 of the impugned judgment). On this issue, the learned Single Judge has placed reliance on several decisions passed by the Apex Court in the case titled as Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Dasappa (B) (Binny Mills Labour Union), (1960) II LLJ 39 SC, Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 860, Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee, (1958) I LLJ 247 SC, and Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, 1 (1999) SLT 212.
(b) The Industrial Tribunal wrongly held that the inquiry proceedings were vitiated on the ground that the Appellant was not permitted to have proper representation. The Court noted that the witnesses of the Management were cross-examined by the Appellant, and therefore, the Industrial Tribunal ought to have examined the question of whether following such a procedure caused any prejudice to the Appellant. This question needed to be addressed before concluding that the inquiry was vitiated due to the lack of representation of the Appellant (reference is made to para 31 of the impugned judgment).
(c) The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to granting approval or rejecting the application, and it cannot order reinstatement with back wages (reference is made to para 36 of the impugned judgment).
From India, Mumbai
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ID ACT SEC.33(A) A BRIEF NOTE.pdf
ID Act.doc