Former Supreme Court Judge has passed a judgement on Wage negotiation principles. If anybody of our forum can explain about that. High Regards N.Devarajan
From India, Madras
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1From India, Madras
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Hi,
Please read the above case here.
Regards,
Umesh Chaudhary
(welcomeumesh@yahoo.com)
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 7378 of 2003
PETITIONER:
Transmission Corporation, A.P. Ltd. & Ors.
RESPONDENT:
P. Ramachandra Rao & Anr
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/04/2006
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & TARUN CHATTERJEE
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
The challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing the writ appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The order of the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition filed by the respondents was affirmed.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
Respondents retired from the services of the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (in short the 'Board') on 30.4.1990 after attaining the age of superannuation. The Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. (in short the 'Corporation') is the successor company of the Board which came into existence with effect from 1.2.1990 by virtue of the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Reforms Act, 1998 (in short the 'Reforms Act'). The pay scales of the employees were revised with effect from 1.7.1990, by which time the respondents herein were drawing the maximum pay in the concerned scale. The rationale of fixing the date with effect from 1.7.1990 was that employees who retired prior to 1.7.1990 are entitled to D.A. at the rate of 38% on the pension, whereas the D.A. payable to pensioners retired on or after 1.7.1990 is 12.4%, but not before the date of the issue of the order. The revised pay scales permitted the grant of three annual increments beyond the time scale in regard to those who had reached or crossed the maximum pay as of 1.7.1986. However, in respect of the respondents herein, the additional amount was shown as personal pay, and the stagnation increments were adjusted towards the said additional amount.
Questioning the correctness of the action of the Corporation and its functionaries, the respondents herein filed a writ petition. The prayer was to direct the appellants herein to fix their pension and other terminal benefits at par with other UDCs retired on or after 1.7.1990 and to pay all the arrears of pensions and other terminal benefits. The learned Single judge, having regard to the intended purpose of the scheme, held that the respondents have been discriminated against while calculating the pension on the ground that they had retired prior to the introduction of the scheme. The stand of the employer, in essence, was that the Board's proceedings Ms. No. 481 dated 4.2.1991 had application only to those who were on its rolls as of 1.7.1990. In view of the fact that the respondents retired on 30.4.1990, the said scheme has no application to them. In any event, the scheme was introduced keeping in view the settlement dated 29.1.1991 entered into between the Wage Negotiation Committee and the Board before the Joint Commissioner of Labour and State Conciliation Officer in terms of Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the 'Act'), and the same cannot be the subject matter of interpretation in the writ petition. In the Appeal, its stand before the learned Single Judge was reiterated before the Division Bench. The stand of the writ petitioners was that the learned Single Judge was justified in its conclusion.
The Division Bench upheld the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in D.S. Nakara & Others V. Union of India (1983 (1) SCC 305), it was held that the cutoff date fixed was discriminatory.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant highlighted that the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench had not considered the issues in their proper perspective. D.S. Nakara's case (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case. There was no challenge to the settlement, and the only challenge relating to the rationale of fixing the cutoff date with effect from 1.7.1990. The conclusion that the respondents were entitled to the stagnation increment deducting the same from the personal pay is clearly tenable.
Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench.
A brief reference to the factual position would be necessary. The relevant portion of the Board's proceedings dated 4.2.1991 is as follows:
"The scales of pay of Office Staff, O & M Staff, Construction Staff, Medical Staff, Fire Fighting Staff, Security Staff, and Teaching Staff, etc. were revised with effect from 1.7.86 in the B.P. first read above as subsequently amended, as per the negotiated settlements with the employees' Unions. The said settlements expired on 30.6.90."
As a result, the earlier settlement expired on 30.6.1990, and paras 5 & 6 are also relevant, and they read as follows:
"The A.P.S.E. Board also directs that the amount of stagnation increments not released earlier in 1986 pay scales but adjusted against P.P. shall now be released on 30.6.1990 but the effect shall be given from 1.7.1990 or from the date of going over to the revised scales, as the case may be, this amount will be taken into account for the purpose of the fixation of pay in the revised pay scales.
The date of option for the revised pay scales shall be 1.7.1990 or the date on which an employee earns his next increment in the existing scale of pay."
The notification issued on 4.2.1991 is in exercise of powers conferred under Section 79(C) of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, which notified Boards' regulations. It is stated in Para 1(ii) that the regulations shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from 1.7.1990. In Clause 2(iv), it is stated that 'Pensioner' means an employee who retired on or after 1.7.1990 but before the date of the issue of the order. The grievance of the writ petitioners basically was that the persons who retired from service after 1.7.1990 were drawing more pension than the writ petitioners. The learned Single judge referred to the Memorandum of Settlement but did not attach much importance to it. The Memorandum of Settlement clearly shows that the period of settlement was from 1.7.1990 to 30.6.1994. The claim of the writ petitioners was that the employer and its functionaries were liable to fix the pension and other terminal benefits of the writ petitioners at par with the other UDCs retired on or after 1.7.1990. As noted above, the grievance was that the said category of persons was drawing more pensions. It was pointed out that the revision of pay scale in BPMs. No. 878 dated 5.10.1981 effective from 1.4.1981 was only for a period of 4 years, and the same was required to be revised after the expiry of the period, i.e., with effect from 1.4.1985. The Board, instead of revising the pay scales with effect from 1.4.1985, revised the same with effect from 1.7.1986. It was, therefore, submitted that the classification as done was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (the 'Constitution').
Learned Single Judge and the Division Bench clearly overlooked the fact that there was no challenge to the settlement. Undisputedly, the three stagnation increments deducted from personal pay have been added to the basic pay. There was no challenge to the settlement made under Section 12(3) of the Act. No finding has been recorded by either the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench that the modality adopted is wrong. It has to be noted that in terms of the Fifth Schedule to the Act under Section 2(ra) as per Sr. No. 13, consequences flow for the failure to implement the award, settlement, or agreement. There is no dispute that the Board's decision is prospective. There is also no challenge to the legality of the Board's decision on the ground that there is no rational for fixing the date, except saying that it should have been done from an earlier date, i.e., 1985 and not from 1.7.1986 as done earlier. There was no challenge at the stage it was done. The line of inquiry whether the settlement was unfair and unjust has been examined by this Court in several decisions.
In Herbertsons Ltd. v. Workmen (1976) 4 SCC 736), this Court called for a finding on the point whether the settlement was fair and just, and it is in the light of the findings of the Tribunal that the appeal was disposed of. Goswami, J. speaking for the three-Judge Bench made it clear that the settlement cannot be judged on the touchstone of the principles that are relevant for the adjudication of an industrial dispute. It was observed that the Tribunal fell into an error in invoking the principles that should govern the adjudication of a dispute regarding dearness allowance in judging whether the settlement was just and fair. The rationale of this principle was explained thus:
"25. There
From India, Delhi
Acknowledge(0)Amend(0)
Please read the above case here.
Regards,
Umesh Chaudhary
(welcomeumesh@yahoo.com)
CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 7378 of 2003
PETITIONER:
Transmission Corporation, A.P. Ltd. & Ors.
RESPONDENT:
P. Ramachandra Rao & Anr
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/04/2006
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & TARUN CHATTERJEE
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
The challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing the writ appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The order of the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition filed by the respondents was affirmed.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
Respondents retired from the services of the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (in short the 'Board') on 30.4.1990 after attaining the age of superannuation. The Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Ltd. (in short the 'Corporation') is the successor company of the Board which came into existence with effect from 1.2.1990 by virtue of the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Reforms Act, 1998 (in short the 'Reforms Act'). The pay scales of the employees were revised with effect from 1.7.1990, by which time the respondents herein were drawing the maximum pay in the concerned scale. The rationale of fixing the date with effect from 1.7.1990 was that employees who retired prior to 1.7.1990 are entitled to D.A. at the rate of 38% on the pension, whereas the D.A. payable to pensioners retired on or after 1.7.1990 is 12.4%, but not before the date of the issue of the order. The revised pay scales permitted the grant of three annual increments beyond the time scale in regard to those who had reached or crossed the maximum pay as of 1.7.1986. However, in respect of the respondents herein, the additional amount was shown as personal pay, and the stagnation increments were adjusted towards the said additional amount.
Questioning the correctness of the action of the Corporation and its functionaries, the respondents herein filed a writ petition. The prayer was to direct the appellants herein to fix their pension and other terminal benefits at par with other UDCs retired on or after 1.7.1990 and to pay all the arrears of pensions and other terminal benefits. The learned Single judge, having regard to the intended purpose of the scheme, held that the respondents have been discriminated against while calculating the pension on the ground that they had retired prior to the introduction of the scheme. The stand of the employer, in essence, was that the Board's proceedings Ms. No. 481 dated 4.2.1991 had application only to those who were on its rolls as of 1.7.1990. In view of the fact that the respondents retired on 30.4.1990, the said scheme has no application to them. In any event, the scheme was introduced keeping in view the settlement dated 29.1.1991 entered into between the Wage Negotiation Committee and the Board before the Joint Commissioner of Labour and State Conciliation Officer in terms of Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the 'Act'), and the same cannot be the subject matter of interpretation in the writ petition. In the Appeal, its stand before the learned Single Judge was reiterated before the Division Bench. The stand of the writ petitioners was that the learned Single Judge was justified in its conclusion.
The Division Bench upheld the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court in D.S. Nakara & Others V. Union of India (1983 (1) SCC 305), it was held that the cutoff date fixed was discriminatory.
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant highlighted that the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench had not considered the issues in their proper perspective. D.S. Nakara's case (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case. There was no challenge to the settlement, and the only challenge relating to the rationale of fixing the cutoff date with effect from 1.7.1990. The conclusion that the respondents were entitled to the stagnation increment deducting the same from the personal pay is clearly tenable.
Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench.
A brief reference to the factual position would be necessary. The relevant portion of the Board's proceedings dated 4.2.1991 is as follows:
"The scales of pay of Office Staff, O & M Staff, Construction Staff, Medical Staff, Fire Fighting Staff, Security Staff, and Teaching Staff, etc. were revised with effect from 1.7.86 in the B.P. first read above as subsequently amended, as per the negotiated settlements with the employees' Unions. The said settlements expired on 30.6.90."
As a result, the earlier settlement expired on 30.6.1990, and paras 5 & 6 are also relevant, and they read as follows:
"The A.P.S.E. Board also directs that the amount of stagnation increments not released earlier in 1986 pay scales but adjusted against P.P. shall now be released on 30.6.1990 but the effect shall be given from 1.7.1990 or from the date of going over to the revised scales, as the case may be, this amount will be taken into account for the purpose of the fixation of pay in the revised pay scales.
The date of option for the revised pay scales shall be 1.7.1990 or the date on which an employee earns his next increment in the existing scale of pay."
The notification issued on 4.2.1991 is in exercise of powers conferred under Section 79(C) of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, which notified Boards' regulations. It is stated in Para 1(ii) that the regulations shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from 1.7.1990. In Clause 2(iv), it is stated that 'Pensioner' means an employee who retired on or after 1.7.1990 but before the date of the issue of the order. The grievance of the writ petitioners basically was that the persons who retired from service after 1.7.1990 were drawing more pension than the writ petitioners. The learned Single judge referred to the Memorandum of Settlement but did not attach much importance to it. The Memorandum of Settlement clearly shows that the period of settlement was from 1.7.1990 to 30.6.1994. The claim of the writ petitioners was that the employer and its functionaries were liable to fix the pension and other terminal benefits of the writ petitioners at par with the other UDCs retired on or after 1.7.1990. As noted above, the grievance was that the said category of persons was drawing more pensions. It was pointed out that the revision of pay scale in BPMs. No. 878 dated 5.10.1981 effective from 1.4.1981 was only for a period of 4 years, and the same was required to be revised after the expiry of the period, i.e., with effect from 1.4.1985. The Board, instead of revising the pay scales with effect from 1.4.1985, revised the same with effect from 1.7.1986. It was, therefore, submitted that the classification as done was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (the 'Constitution').
Learned Single Judge and the Division Bench clearly overlooked the fact that there was no challenge to the settlement. Undisputedly, the three stagnation increments deducted from personal pay have been added to the basic pay. There was no challenge to the settlement made under Section 12(3) of the Act. No finding has been recorded by either the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench that the modality adopted is wrong. It has to be noted that in terms of the Fifth Schedule to the Act under Section 2(ra) as per Sr. No. 13, consequences flow for the failure to implement the award, settlement, or agreement. There is no dispute that the Board's decision is prospective. There is also no challenge to the legality of the Board's decision on the ground that there is no rational for fixing the date, except saying that it should have been done from an earlier date, i.e., 1985 and not from 1.7.1986 as done earlier. There was no challenge at the stage it was done. The line of inquiry whether the settlement was unfair and unjust has been examined by this Court in several decisions.
In Herbertsons Ltd. v. Workmen (1976) 4 SCC 736), this Court called for a finding on the point whether the settlement was fair and just, and it is in the light of the findings of the Tribunal that the appeal was disposed of. Goswami, J. speaking for the three-Judge Bench made it clear that the settlement cannot be judged on the touchstone of the principles that are relevant for the adjudication of an industrial dispute. It was observed that the Tribunal fell into an error in invoking the principles that should govern the adjudication of a dispute regarding dearness allowance in judging whether the settlement was just and fair. The rationale of this principle was explained thus:
"25. There
From India, Delhi
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