Dear Friends,
It may be appropriate to take note of the discussion that took place in this forum some time back - refer to the link -
https://www.citehr.com/471221-factor...-does-car.html
There have been judgments and opinions for and against what constitutes "a factory." There are judgments from various state High Courts and the Supreme Court as well. It is also to be noted that various activities are being added to the list of "factories." In many instances, if we see these lists and activities associated with them, literally no manufacturing activities or transformation from one product to new products take place. But still, these processes are declared as "manufacturing processes," and therefore they are factories.
Petrol Pumps as Factories
Coming to the Petrol Pump (bunks), which are retail outlets for petrol/diesel or oil distribution networks, a natural question arises: what exactly "a process" takes place in this retail distribution? And how could it be termed as a "factory"? Going by various definitions provided under various Acts, please consider the following observations:
Quote: Business Standard dated May 8, 2014:
Pumping oil in a petrol pump is a manufacturing process, so ruled the Supreme Court in a very recent judgment. But it is not considered manufacture under Central Excise Law. It is manufacture under the Factories Act, 1948. The principle is that the definition in one law is not valid for another law.
The Employees’ State Insurance Act 1948 applies to all factories. A petrol pump is a factory by dint of Section 2(12) of this Act because a factory means any premises where 10 or more persons are employed for wages and in any part of which a manufacturing process is carried out. Now, a manufacturing process includes pumping oil under Section 2(k)(ii) of the Factories Act 1948. Thus, legally, a petrol pump is carrying on a manufacturing process. Therefore, it is liable to pay contributions under the Employees’ State Insurance Act. After holding this legal position, the Supreme Court has observed by way of clarification that the word manufacturing process or manufacture does not mean the same thing in all the statutes. The word manufacture under the Central Excise Act means bringing into existence a different commodity, whereas under the Factories Act, simply pumping oil becomes a manufacturing process.
To a layman, it is conceptually somewhat difficult to accept that merely pumping petrol in a petrol pump is manufacture. But, when the purpose is taken into account, it becomes easy to understand. The idea is to provide insurance cover to the workers when there are more than 10 working in an enterprise where pumping oil, water, sewerage, or any other substance is going on. That is why in the Factories Act, the definition of manufacturing process is very wide. The definition also includes repairing, refitting, and finishing of a ship or vessel. This definition includes so many activities which are strictly not manufacture as we understand in common parlance.
Purpose of Definitions in Different Acts
The definition goes with the purpose of the Act. A definition in one Act is not applicable in another Act because the purposes are different. The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act has its purpose so wide that practically anything a person puts into his mouth comes under its fold. But excise or customs law does not have such a wide range of purpose. In Central Excise, food is understood in a completely different meaning. Gambier, which is a condiment taken with betel leaf, is by no means regarded as food by anybody. But gambier is considered food under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act because the idea of this Act is to prevent food adulteration. Even biscuits, ice cream, or cold drinks are not regarded as food in common parlance. So they don’t get the benefit of exemption on food, but they are considered food under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
However, the Bombay High Court has observed that the principle that a definition given to a word or expression in a particular Act cannot be utilized for the interpretation of a similar word or expression occurring in a different Act is not "an absolute principle of law." Said the Court, "generally it is so, but in a given case, the definition given in a particular statute not being repugnant, may be used to construe and interpret the same expression occurring in another statute." In this Bombay case, the popular meaning of drugs for the purpose of excise law and the definition of drugs in the Drugs and Cosmetics Act are not different, and so there was no harm in consulting the definition of the other Act.
Regards,